We consider the problem of the existence of natural improvement dynamics leading to approximate pure Nash equilibria, with a reasonable small approximation, and the problem of bounding the efficiency of such equilibria in the fundamental framework of weighted congestion game with polynomial latencies of degree at most d ≥ 1. In this work, by exploiting a simple technique, we firstly show that the game always admits a d-approximate potential function. This implies that every sequence of d-approximate improvement moves by the players always leads the game to a d-approximate pure Nash equilibrium. As a corollary, we also obtain that, under mild assumptions on the structure of the players' strategies, the game always admits a constant approximate potential function. Secondly, by using a simple potential function argument, we are able to show that in the game there always exists a (d + δ)-approximate pure Nash equilibrium, with δ ∈ [0, 1], whose cost is 2/(1 + δ) times the cost of any optimal state.
Introduction
Among other solution concepts, the notion of pure Nash equilibrium plays a central role in Game Theory. Pure Nash equilibria in a game characterize situations in which no player has any incentive to unilaterally deviate from the current situation in order to achieve a higher payoff. Unfortunately, it is well known that there are games that do not have pure Nash equilibria. Furhermore, even in games where the existence of pure Nash equilibria is guaranteed, these equilibria could be very inefficient with respect to solutions dictated by a central authority. Such negative results significantly question the importance of pure Nash equilibria as solution concepts that characterize the behavior of rational players.
One way to override the limitations of the non-existence and inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria, is to consider a relaxation of the stability constraints. This relaxation leads to the concept of approximate pure Nash equilibrium. This concept characterizes situations where no player can significantly improve its payoff by unilaterally deviating from its current strategy. Pure Nash equilibria can accommodate small modelling inaccuracies due to uncertainty (e.g., see the arguments in [4] ), therefore they may be more desirable as solution concepts in practical decision making settings. Beside mere existence and efficiency, approximate pure Nash equilibria are also an appealing alternative solution concept from a computational point of view [2] .
In this work, we investigate the existence and efficiency of approximate pure Nash equilibria in the context of the weighted congestion game. This game is a general framework which models situations in which a group of agents compete to use a set of shared resources. In the following subsections we introduce the weighted congestion game and give a formal statement of the problems we address. We conclude this section with a discussion about the current literature and a detailed presentation of our contribution.
Weighted congestion game. Let us start with an informal description of the game. In a weighted congestion game, players compete over a set of resources. Each player has a nonnegative weight. Each resource incurs a latency to all players that use it; this latency depends on the total weight (congestion) of the players that use the resource according to a resourcespecific, non-negative, and non-decreasing latency function. Among a given set of strategies (over sets of resources), each player aims to select one selfishly, trying to minimize its individual total cost, i.e., the sum of the latencies on the resources in its strategy. Typical examples include weighted congestion games in networks, where the network links correspond to the resources and each player has alternative paths that connect two nodes as strategies. Now, let us describe the game more formally.
The weighted congestion game with polynomial latencies of degree at most d ∈ Z ≥1 is a collection of instances, denoted by
is the set of strategies of player i and (a e , k e ) ∈ R >0 × Z ≥1 are the coefficient and the degree of resource e ∈ E respectively, which encode the latency function ℓ e : 2 N → R ≥0 associated with e, mapping every subset of players P ⊆ N to the non-negative real
For every state s we refer to its i-th component, that is the strategy played by player i in s, by s(i). For every state s and resource e ∈ E, we denote by L e (s) the set of players using resource e in s, i.e., L e (s) = {j ∈ N : e ∈ s(i)}. We refer to the sum of the weights of all the players in L e (s) as the congestion of e in s. For every state s ∈ S(G), the cost incurred by player i ∈ N in s is c i (s) = e∈s(i) ℓ e (L e (s)), while the social cost of s is the weighted sum of the players' costs, i.e., C(s) = i∈N w i c i (s). Notice that, by summing over the resources instead of the players, C(s) can be rewritten as
. Let w max be the greatest weight in G, we say that G is mildly congested if L e (s) ≥ (k e + 1)w max , for every resource e ∈ E and state s ∈ S(G).
Preliminary definitions. In this subsection we introduce concepts we need to formally state our problems and present our results. Let us consider an instance G = N, E, (w i ) i∈N , (S i ) i∈N , (a e , k e ) e∈E of WCG(d). For every state s ∈ S(G) and every s ∈ S i , we denote by [s −i , s] the new state obtained from s by setting the i-th component, that is the strategy of i, to s and keeping all the remaining components unchanged, i.e., [s −i , s](i) = s. The transition from s to [s −i , s] is called a move of player i from state s. For α ≥ 1, we say that a transition from s to [s
). For α ≥ 1, we say that a state-value function Γ : S(G) → R ≥0 is an α-approximate potential function for G if it strictly decreases at every strictly α-improvement move; formally, Γ([s −i , s]) < Γ(s) whenever αc i ([s −i , s]) < c i (s). If G admits an α-approximate potential function Γ then every sequence of strictly α-improvement moves leads to a local optimum of Γ, that is a state in which no further strictly improvement move can be performed; such state is called α-approximate pure Nash equilibrium. Formally, for α ≥ 1, we say that a state s ∈ S(G) is an α-approximate pure Nash equilibrium if, for every player i ∈ N and every strategy s ∈ S i , we have c i (s) ≤ αc i ([s −i , s]). If α = 1 we simply refer to s as a pure Nash equilibrium rather than a 1-approximate pure Nash equilibrium. For α ≥ 1, we denote by E α (G) ⊆ S(G) the set of all α-approximate pure Nash equilibria of G. Every state s ∈ S(G) minimizing the social cost is called a social optimum. We denote by OPT(G) the set of social optima of G, i.e., OPT(G) = arg min s∈S(G) C(s). Let o ∈ OPT(G) be any social optimum of G, we define the α-approximate price of stability of G as PoS α (G) = min e∈Eα(G)
Problem statement. In this work we consider the problem of the existence of natural improvement dynamics leading to approximate pure Nash equilibria, with a reasonable small approximation, and the problem of bounding the efficiency of such equilibria in the fundamental framework of weighted congestion game with polynomial latencies of degree at most d ≥ 1.
We formally state such problems as follows.
(I) Existence of Convergent sequence of α-improvement moves. In this problem, given any instance G of WCG(d), we seek for a reasonable small α ≥ 1 for which any sequence of α-improvement moves in G converges to an α-approximate pure Nash equilibrium. This would be equivalent to say that G admits an αapproximate potential function, whose value decreases at every α-improvement move and whose local optimum coincides with the α-approximate pure Nash equilibrium.
(II) Bounding the approximate price of stability. In this problem, given any instance G of WCG(d), which admits an α-approximate pure Nash equilibrium, we aim at bounding the α-approximate price of stability of G.
Related works. The unweighted congestion game (i.e., when all players have unit weight) has been widely studied in the literature. Rosenthal [15] proved that this game admits a 1approximate potential function. This immediately implies that every sequence of 1-improvement moves by the players leads the game to a pure Nash equilibrium. For the weighted congestion game, a 1-approximate potential function exists only when the latencies are linear or exponential [9, 12, 14] . For polynomial latencies (of constant maximum degree strictly higher than 1), pure Nash equilibria may not exist [9, 10, 13] . In general, for arbitrary latencies, the problem of deciding whether a given instance of weighted congestion game has a pure Nash equilibrium is NP-hard [8] . Caragiannis et al. [2] proved that every instance of weighted congestion game with polynomial latencies of degree at most d admits a d!-approximate potential function. This results has been subsequently improved by Hansknecht et al. [11] . They showed that every instance of weighted congestion game with polynomial latencies admits a (d + 1)-approximate potential function. The potential function they proposed is a Rosenthal-like potential function. Roughly speaking, they obtained an approximate potential as follows. For each resource, they chose an appropriate fixed ordering of the players. Then, for each resource separately, they computed a discrete integral. Specifically, they sum up the latency of the resource after introducing the first player multiplied with the weight of the first player, the latency after introducing the first two players multiplied with the weight of the second player, and so on, i.e., w 1 ℓ e ({w 1 }) + w 2 ℓ e ({w 1 +w 2 })+. . .. The potential obtained depends on the way the players have been initially ordered. The authors showed that, the potential function providing the best approximation for polynomial latencies, that is d+1, is the one obtained by ordering the players in a non-decreasing way, i.e., w 1 ≤ w 2 ≤ . . .. For the 1-approximate price of stability, for the unweighted game, there exists a bound of 1.577 for linear latencies [7, 3] and a bound of Θ(d) for polynomial latencies [5] . The 1approximate price of stability for the weighted game has been recently investigated in [6] . They provided a lower bound of Ω(d/ log d) d+1 , matching the upper bound in [1] , for the weighted game with polynomial latencies. The authors also showed bounds to the α-approximate price of stability. Specifically, they proved that for the weighted congestion game with polynomial latencies and player weights ranging in [1, W ] , there exists an α-approximate pure Nash equilibrium, for any α in the range [ 2(d+1)W 2W +d+1 , d + 1], whose cost is 1 + ( d+1 α − 1)W the cost of any optimal state. Their prove exploits a potential function called Faulhaber's potential.
Our contribution. Concerning the first problem, we show (Theorem 3.2) that every instance of WCG(d) admits in general d-approximate potential functions. This implies that every sequence of d-approximate improvement moves by the players always leads the game to a d-approximate pure Nash equilibrium. This result is achieved by using the technique formalised in Theorem 3.1 and the class of state-value functions Φ γ defined in Definition 2.1. Essentially, while Definition 2.1 provides a simple interesting class of candidate potential functions, Theorem 3.1 gives a local condition to each resource to determine the approximation guarantee achieved by a given state-value function. So, by exploiting Theorem 3.1, in Theorem 3.2 we are able to show that the class Φ γ contains d-approximate potential functions and, more generally, (d + δ)-approximate potential functions, for every δ ≥ 0. We want to remark that, our potential functions are substantially different from the potential function proposed in [11] . In fact, while the potential in [11] is obtained in a Rosenthal-like fashion, by ordering the players and summing their costs, by assuming that each player is affected only by the congestion caused by preceding players in the ordering, our potential, more simply, is obtained by a suitable scaling of the coefficients of the polynomials. As a matter of fact, our potentials, despite their simplicity, provide an approximation of d instead of d + 1; although it is worth noticing that, for very small degrees, the two approaches provide the same approximation guarantee (see Table 1 ). As a corollary of Theorem 3.2, we also show (Corollary 3.1) that the social optimum of an instance of WCG(d) is always a (d + 1)-approximate pure Nash equilibrium, as it has already been observed in [6] . More importantly, Theorem 3.2 implies that, as state by Corollary 3.2, every mildly congested instance of WCG(d) always admits a e e−1 -approximate potential function, where e is the Euler's number.
We also show that, the class of functions Φ γ also serves as an essential tool to give a constant bound on the approximate price of stability. In fact, by exploiting Φ γ , we are able to show (Theorem 4.1) an upper bound of 2/(1 + δ) for the (d + δ)-approximate price of stability, for every δ ∈ [0, 1]. To prove this bound, we use the standard potential function argument. Specifically, we first give bounds (Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 4.2) relating the value of the (d + δ)-approximate potential function for a given state to the social cost of that state; if we then perform a sequence of (d + δ)-improvement moves starting from an optimal state, the potential does not increase, and hence we can bound the cost of any (d + δ)-approximate pure Nash equilibrium that we reach. Notice that our bound does not depend on the weights of the players and significantly improves the bound provided in [6] , by making use of a different and simpler potential function.
Roadmap. We begin with the definition of a class of state-value functions in Section 2. In Section 3 we first present a simple technique to bound the approximation guarantee of a given state-value function, subsequently we show that some elements of the class introduced in Section 2 provide a good approximation. In Section 4 we present the bound on the approximate price of stability. Finally, in section 5 we present a couple of technical lemmas.
A class of state-value functions
In this section we define a class of functions mapping every state of the game to a non-negative real number. This class of functions will be exploited in the subsequent sections. 
Approximate potential functions
The main result of this section is stated by Theorem 3.2, where we show the existence of good approximate potential functions. Before showing this result, in Theorem 3.1 we illustrate our tool to define an approximate potential function. Such tool gives a local condition to each resource to determine the approximation guarantee of a given state-value function. We conclude this section with two corollaries, the first (Corollary 3.1) showing that the social optimum of an instance of WCG(d) is always a (d + 1)-approximate pure Nash equilibrium, the second (Corollary 3.2) showing that, under mild conditions, the game always admits a constant approximate potential function. (2)
where (2) We are ready to present the main result of this section. 
(see Table 1 ); 2. if γ e = k e , for every e ∈ E, then Φ γ is a d-approximate potential function for G;
3. if γ e = k e + δ, for every e ∈ E and δ ≥ 0, then Φ γ is a (d + δ)-approximate potential function for G.
Proof. We prove the claim by using Theorem 3.1. Therefore, for every resource e ∈ E, every non-empty subset of players P ⊆ N and every player i ∈ P , we bound the ratio
a e Ψ γe e (P ) − Ψ γe e (P \ {i}) .
Let us explicitly rewrite the numerator and denominator of the previous expression. We distinguish the cases |P | = {i} and |P | ≥ 2. Let us fist assume |P | = {i}. In this case for w i ℓ e (P ) we get w i ℓ e (P ) = w i a e (w i ) ke = a e w ke+1 i .
(8)
On the other hand, for the expression Ψ γe e (P ) − Ψ γe e (P \ {i}), using Definition 2.1, we have
Therefore, by combining (8) and (9), we can conclude that, for |P | = {i}, for the ratio (7) we have 
Not let us assume |P | ≥ 2. In this case for w i ℓ e (P ) we get
Now, let us focus on the expression Ψ γe e (P ) − Ψ γe e (P \ {i}). For every i ∈ P , let λ i (P ) = 
Therefore, by combining (11) and (12), we can conclude that, for |P | ≥ 2, for the expression (7) we have
Now we apply Lemma 5.1 to (13), by setting x = λ i (P ), h = k e and β = γ e . If γ e = 1, we obtain w i ℓ e (P ) a e Ψ γe e (P ) − Ψ γe e (P \ {i})
if γ e = k e , we have w i ℓ e (P ) a e Ψ γe e (P ) − Ψ γe e (P \ {i})
finally, if γ e = k e + δ, with δ ≥ 0, we have
Claim (1) follows by combining (10), (13) and (14) , and by applying Theorem 3.1. Claim (2) and (3) follow by combining (10), (15) and (16), and by applying Theorem 3.1. 
(a e , k e ) e∈E be an instance of WCG(d). Any social optimum of G is a (d + 1)-approximate pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let us consider the function Φ(s) = e∈E Ψ γe e (L e (s)) (defined in Theorem 3.2), with γ e = k e + 1. The claim follows from observing that Φ is equal to the social cost C(s), and that, by Theorem 3.2(3), Φ(s) is also a (d + 1)-approximate potential function.
Corollary 3.2. Let G = N, E, (w i ) i∈N , (S i ) i∈N , (a e , k e ) e∈E be a mildly congested instance of WCG(d). If γ e = 1, for every e ∈ E, then Φ γ is a e e−1 -approximate potential function for G, where e is the Euler's number.
Proof Sketch. Since G is mildly congested, we have L e (s) ≥ (k e + 1)w max , for every resource e ∈ E and state s ∈ S(G), where w max denotes the greatest weight in G. Under this condition, we can restrict the proof of Theorem 3.2 to the case in which the generic subset of player P is such that j∈P w j ≥ (k e + 1)w max . With this condition in place, we have that, for every i ∈ P , λ i (P ) is at least k e . In fact,
By using the previous inequality, it is easy to prove that the expression (13) , y = j∈P w ke+1 j and β = ke+1 ke+δ .
In the following lemma, we give bounds relating the value of the approximate potential function for a given state to the social cost of that state. 
Proof. Let E = {e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e m }. Let us bound the ratio
.
In order to bound C(s)/Φ γ (s), we consider the ratio between the t-th term in the numerator and the t-th term in the denominator, for every t ∈ [1, m] , that is 
where the second inequality follows from (21). From which the claim follows.
Technical lemmas
In this section we present two technical lemmas. Lemma 5.1 is used in the proof of Theorem 3.2, while Lemma 5.2 is used in the proof of Lemma 4.1.
Lemma 5.1. For every x ∈ R >0 , h ∈ Z ≥1 and β ∈ R ≥1 , we have
Proof. 
where (22) holds because
In order to bound (23), for every t ∈ [0, h] we consider the ratio between the coefficient of the term x t in the numerator and the coefficient of the same term in the denominator. For t = 0 the ratio is 1, while for t ∈ [1, h] the ratio is h+1−t β . For the case β ∈ [1, h], we get that the smallest ratio is 1/β while the greatest is h/β. It follows that, when β ∈ [1, h], the expression in (23) is at least 1/β and at most h/β. For the case β ≥ h, we obtain that the smallest is 1/β while the greatest ratio is 1df. Therefore, when β ≥ h, the expression in (23) is at least 1/β and at most 1. From which the claim follows.
Lemma 5.2. For every x, y, β ∈ R >0 such that β ≥ 1 and y ≤ x, we have
Proof.
where the last inequality is due to the fact that y/x ≤ 1. where the last inequality is due to the fact that y/x > 0.
